

HER GRACE
OF
MARLBOROUGH's
PARTY-GIBBERISH
EXPLAINED,
AND THE
True Sons of the CHURCH
VINDICATED.

By an HONOURABLE HAND.

L O N D O N:

Printed for T. COOPER at the *Globe* in *Pater-noster*
Row, MDCCXLII.

HER. GRACE

MARLBOROUGH

PARTY-GIBBERISH

EXPLAINED



The Song of the Church

VINDICATED

By an Honourable Hand

LONDON:

Printed for T. Cooper in Pall Mall

1763. MDCCXIII.

PARTY-GIBBERISH

EXPLAINED, &c.

IT could not indeed be reasonably expected, that a fine Lady who owns her *having never read, nor employed her time in any thing but playing at cards*, in the early part of her life, should throw away any of that precious time then or afterwards, in enquiring into the meaning of what she is pleased to honour with the title of *Party-Gibberish*: No, her Grace had surely been much better instructed by her *virtuous mother*. Nothing less than the widely extended *sphere of politicks*, the *examining titles to estates, bills in Chancery*, and *accounts*, could be objects worthy of her Grace's great and penetrating genius: such then must be the employment which may naturally be supposed (for the good of the Nation and that of *her Family*) to take place of *card-playing*, for the remaining part of her Grace's life, and consequently no time left for the insipid, dry, mortifying, *unprofitable amusement* of speculating upon the exploded doctrine of *non-resistance*, in her Grace's opinion, nothing more nor better than the mere *Party-Gibberish* of an inconsistent, abominable set of men, called *Tories* and *High-Church-men*.

GIBBERISH, we own, is a very unintelligible kind of language, the language only of *Rosicrucians* and *Gypsies*; but as this *Party-Tory-Gibberish* her Grace speaks of happens unluckily to be the *Gibberish* of our old musty law-books, both *common* and

and *statute*, not to mention another old dirty worm-eaten book, called the book of HOMILIES (and as such consequently deserving some degree of attention) we thought therefore we could not do greater honour to her Grace's late ingenious Account of her own Conduct, with which she has entertained the World, than by giving her readers an explanation of the *Party-Gibberish* of *non-resistance* mentioned in her Grace's book; and this we shall be happily enabled to do from one of the *ablest* as well as *honestest* lawyers of his time, namely, the honourable ROGER NORTH, Esq; younger brother of the great and truly worthy Lord-Keeper NORTH, who in his EXAMEN or ENQUIRY into the third volume of Dr. *White Kennet's* complete history, in vindicating the *Tory-Clergy* from the vile aspersions and malicious insinuations of the author of the *Complete History*, proceeds thus.

—Pag. 326.— ‘ But now for a touch of malice
 ‘ upon this occasion; observe the author published
 ‘ this book after King James left England, and
 ‘ King William was possessed of the throne, when
 ‘ he could not but know how these *other*, that is
 ‘ the *Tory*, clergy (in the former reign) after Popery
 ‘ came forward in earnest, left the cause of
 ‘ fanaticism and most efficaciously declaimed and
 ‘ wrote against popery, which was then become
 ‘ the dangerous case. What reason therefore has
 ‘ the author to revile them for doing the like against
 ‘ non-conformity, at a time when there was
 ‘ most need? Or where has he done them right
 ‘ for the great good they did, and the evils the
 ‘ best preferred of them suffered, in that time, with
 ‘ an uncommon zeal, publick spirit, and constancy?
 ‘ While the fanatics and their conforming friends
 ‘ preached and addressed at another
 ‘ rate.

‘ rate. But to say truth, there was no time when
 ‘ they let drop wholly the cause of Popery; but
 ‘ they never kept the people under a guard and
 ‘ awake, as far as was reasonable, with respect to
 ‘ the popish adversaries, whenever occasion was
 ‘ given. Ay, says the author (*in effect*) *but then*
 ‘ *they should have let fanaticks and rebellious dissenters*
 ‘ *alone.*

‘ To conclude therefore with a clear explication
 ‘ of *running down*, an ambigue term of the au-
 ‘ thor’s, it is to be noted in short, that after the
 ‘ dissolution of the *Oxford* and *Westminster* par-
 ‘ liaments, the whole nation came into the inte-
 ‘ rests of the crown, and signified as much by
 ‘ almost universal acclamations and addressees; all
 ‘ expressing the utmost detestation and abhorrence
 ‘ of the *Whig* principles: which made the whole
 ‘ party shoot the pit and retire, as not daring to
 ‘ be pointed at with ill-favoured reflections. And
 ‘ this is the *running down* the author charges upon
 ‘ the *other*, or loyal conformable clergy, as mov-
 ‘ ing only from their petulance. So kind is he to
 ‘ them, whose behaviour and conduct had been
 ‘ applauded, and their persons revered by the
 ‘ whole nation.’

‘ But he says farther that, *these other divines*
 ‘ *pretended to be more afraid of a republick than of*
 ‘ *a popish successor.* We are among the indefi-
 ‘ nites still. By these *other* I hope he doth not
 ‘ mean the good Archbishop of *Canterbury*, and
 ‘ those other Bishops, who were confessors, and
 ‘ went to the *Tower* and trial, at the peril of all
 ‘ the good they could in all their lives expect and
 ‘ enjoy in the reign of King James II. but he is
 ‘ undetermined, and brings all into the scrape toge-
 ‘ ther. He continues his good character of these
 ‘ *others*, and makes them arrant hypocrites and

' knaves that *pretended*; &c. which I understand
 ' to mean counterfeited; and knowing better, acted
 ' against their consciences. It had been more ci-
 ' vil to have given them up, as at first, for a par-
 ' cel of irreclaimable wretches, blockheads, and
 ' scots that knew no better. But let us see now
 ' what the case might have been if these *others* had
 ' wanted, as the author has declared, common
 ' sense. Then it is possible they might think re-
 ' bellion, and what it drives at, change of go-
 ' vernment, to be a *Pandora's* box, fraught with
 ' all sorts of evils to a nation, worse than plague,
 ' pestilence, and famine. And perhaps their small
 ' skill in history might lead them into such a way
 ' of thinking.'

' But, passing by this politick gear, the au-
 ' thor may put the matter upon a wrong point,
 ' and that is fear; as supposing they took mea-
 ' sures, like himself, from temporal good and
 ' evil, and weighed only that which was like to
 ' do them most good or hurt. He may think
 ' them interested, but mistaken! while perhaps
 ' those silly *other* divines, in truth, might have
 ' squeamish consciences, and for want of the au-
 ' thor's better learning and instruction have no-
 ' tions of divine right, that is of things which no
 ' human power ought to deprive or alter, as the
 ' doctrines of the Gospel, whereof they might
 ' say *non-resistance* is one. And it seems, by their
 ' doctrines and behaviour, that they did not (as the
 ' author flurs it) *pretend*, but were *really* of opi-
 ' nion, that duty and allegiance to governors did
 ' not depend on any religion, christian, or hea-
 ' then, and that they ought to obey idolatrous or
 ' heathen princes in all lawful commands; and,
 ' if for conscience they could not obey, they chose
 ' rather to suffer than, with force and arms to
 ' resist.

resist. And this, with such skill as they had;
 (if the author will be pleased) they pretended to
 prove: and really, if one may guess by their
 sermons and discourses in print, which the au-
 thor, or any of *his clergy*, have not as yet con-
 futed; they have, as it were, done it. And;
 as they pretend, not only by sacred authority,
 and the examples of the best Christians, but by
 their own also, shewing their faith by their
 works, directly contrary to the author's libel,
 that sets them forth for pretenders only. And
 for all the matters here touched, whoever will
 be better informed, may consult the many learned
 books wrote and published on these subjects.
 But thus much I thought fit to represent in op-
 position to the defamatory spirit of this foul
 writer, that hath had face enough to charge hy-
 pocrify upon such an incomparable college of
 divines, as then had stations of authority in the
 church, at whom he spits, in the most injurious
 manner, through the comprehensive account of
 his *other* clergymen.'

But he will come closer yet; he opens his
 budget by degrees. He says that these *other*
clergy run into such high notions of passive-obe-
dience and unbounded prerogative. — Who can
 guess the sense of this rabble expression, *high*
notions? Why could not he say what notions?
 Words, that signify nothing, by dint of cor-
 rupt prejudice in men's minds, are made to sig-
 nify any thing, and they shall not feel themselves,
 though, in that manner, they are drawn in to
 credit contraries: and that is the drift of this
 no-sense, or rather nonsense. But observe the
 serpentine subtilty of this sentence. He plants
 his *passive-obedience* and *unbounded prerogative*
 close together, as meaning the same thing, and

B

' both

' both relating to arbitrary power ; so that who-
 ' ever takes the one has the other of course : but for
 ' to say any of them was for *passive-obedience* and
 ' against *unbounded prerogative*, or who run not
 ' into the setting it up, will be reckoned, accord-
 ' ing to this text, arrant nonsense. So the author
 ' affirms these *other* clergy were a pack of *traitors*
 ' of the law and rights of the people, and setters
 ' up of *unbounded prerogative*. If the words can
 ' bear a lower sense, I knock under ; but as they
 ' stand, and are obviously to be understood, we have
 ' exposed before us a most egregious falsary. It
 ' being notorious that no persons less yielded to
 ' undue *prerogatives* than the men of *passive-obe-*
 ' *dience* did ; and the very terms, as well as the
 ' intention of that doctrine, carry it so : for com-
 ' plying, is setting up of prerogative, and suf-
 ' fering is denying of it ; and more effectual
 ' than rising up in arms to resist it. Now take
 ' the whole character of this venerable body of
 ' the clergy of *England* in general, described in
 ' his *other* clergy. They had no concern against
 ' popery, were loose in their principles touching
 ' the rights of the church and state : persons de-
 ' bauched and illiterate ; valued themselves on a
 ' factious distinction ; were drawn into any thing ;
 ' *run down* their betters with noise ; pretended one
 ' thing and thought another ; and, finally, by
 ' certain tricks, called *high notions*, set up *un-*
 ' *bounded prerogative*, that is, arbitrary power in
 ' the nation. If this be not a sufficient eulogy,
 ' let the author think again, and mend it if he
 ' can.'

' Having now brought our *other* clergy to the
 ' bar for *passive-obedience* and *non-resistance*, which
 ' are principles that allow no sort of rebellion, or
 ' resistance of government, with force, to be law-
 ' ful :

‘ ful : These scurvey tenets must be battered to
 ‘ pieces ; else, what will become of us about the
 ‘ Rye business? Towards the beginning of this
 ‘ * reign the author is guilty of a pleasant nicety.
 ‘ He quarrels with the *non-resistance test*, called
 ‘ the *corporation-act*, which some, as he says, took
 ‘ with a distinction ; and, if we believe his mar-
 ‘ gin, it was a very odd one, *viz.* to the word
 ‘ *endeavour* mentally to add *lawful*, which, as
 ‘ they understood, referred to parliamentary acts,
 ‘ whereby the government might be *lawfully* chang-
 ‘ ed, and so salved their oath. But this author
 ‘ would mend their reserve ; for, to the words
 ‘ *taking arms against the King or persons* (legally,
 ‘ adds he) *commissioned*. And again, *In (legal,*
 ‘ *says he) pursuance of such commission*. The imper-
 ‘ tinence of all this shews the author’s penchant
 ‘ towards disguises, and masquerading seditious
 ‘ practices that tend to open rebellion. For every
 ‘ commission is, *eo nomine*, *legal* ; else it is nulli-
 ‘ ty : so for the authority, it justifies no acts, not
 ‘ legal. But he would be understood thus ; being
 ‘ *legal*, may not be resisted, *ergo*, *illegal* may :
 ‘ which is false Logick ; but so long as he puts it
 ‘ in the mouths of a rabble to say *legal* or *illegal*,
 ‘ either is at hand to serve the turn ; true or false,
 ‘ it is enough to say it. But he might have spared
 ‘ his remark, for that act of parliament made no
 ‘ new law, but declared the old, requiring only
 ‘ a recognition of the law as it then stood. And
 ‘ the Author may wonder when I tell him, that
 ‘ taking up arms upon any account whatever, with
 ‘ or without his odd distinction, is utterly against
 ‘ law ; and (excepting the cases only of invasions,
 ‘ or great depredations, when every private man

* Charles the Second’s.

' is a Constable for repelling such enemies, and
 ' acts by a presumed authority of the government)
 ' the rule before laid down, was, in all that reign,
 ' deemed to be universally the law of *England*.
 ' But because the author builds so much of his re-
 ' bellious apologeticks upon the contrary tenents,
 ' that force, even against the government, or any
 ' part of it, may be lawful, and the subject mat-
 ' ter hath entertained the most able and learned
 ' pens of this latter age, and not at all upon the
 ' same topicks of reasoning ; I think it will be
 ' justice to the controversy, to shew the sum of
 ' what those persons alledge for *non-resistance*, that
 ' argue properly upon the most suitable heads ;
 ' which seem to be those of the people's allegiance,
 ' pursuant to the positive law of the land, and the
 ' rights of the monarchy of *England*, as they are
 ' by law expressly and indubitably established.'

' If it be a truth that laws (however originated)
 ' bind a people, then the people of *England* are
 ' bound not to resist (with force) the King, or
 ' those commissioned by him, in any case, or
 ' upon any pretence whatsoever. This is what
 ' they alledge, by way of *Thema*, that argue
 ' from positive law ; and thence (say they) it
 ' flows, and is a known maxim of *English* law,
 ' that the person of the sovereign is dispunishable
 ' and incoercible by force ; and, in the practica-
 ' ble forms of proceeding, transgressions against
 ' this law are judged upon accusations after the
 ' form of high treason. This consequence of law
 ' the maintainers of resistance scarce deny ; for
 ' they seem to go off from, and surmount posi-
 ' tive law, supposing a power, they call the
 ' people, superior to all law, having it in their
 ' hands to reduce laws and law-makers all toge-
 ' ther ; and so they think they argue upon sure
 ' grounds.

' grounds. But, say the others, this eludes the
 ' hypothesis, which is, that the people are subject,
 ' and bound by the laws : for it is the same as to
 ' say there is no law but in active force, which
 ' force is not constant ; for sometimes one, then
 ' another division or faction of the people proves
 ' to be strongest. And then the laws, if such
 ' may be, are ambulatory, and that, which men
 ' call right and wrong, is contingent, as a wea-
 ' ther-cock that varies with the air : all which is
 ' ridiculous to affirm in discourse. But, in a na-
 ' tion that hath established laws, all questions of
 ' right and wrong are delated to executive power,
 ' in such methods of determination as the laws
 ' have prescribed ; that is, by regular process be-
 ' fore competent judges, against whom there is no
 ' just exception.'

' Then, say they, nothing can justify resistance,
 ' but what will amount to a just and legal defence
 ' upon an indictment of *high treason*. If so, exa-
 ' mine all the ordinary pretensions for resistance,
 ' as first, the abuse of royal power. That will
 ' not do, for it is a rule of law, that *the King can*
 ' *do no wrong*, because all acts of government
 ' against law, are nullities ; and such have no
 ' legal effect, and justify no commissioner or agent
 ' whatsoever. Then, next, immediate violence
 ' from the person of the King upon a subject, will
 ' also fail ; for *se defendendo* is no legal plea in
 ' case of an inferior officer, much less in treason ;
 ' for the law against compassing the death of the
 ' King, hath no exception. Then, as to personal de-
 ' fects or incapacities, be it in the highest degree,
 ' as madness, lunacy, infancy, or negligence,
 ' they afford no matter of defence in *treason* ;
 ' for, whatever the resisters say, the LAW says
 ' there can be no such thing : for, if human in-
 ' firmity

‘ firmity may in such cases be alledged, ill people will ever pretend it, to serve the turn of their ambition. In a word, the law owns no mischief to a people in general, or particular, so considerable as to be put in the scales against *high treason*. Littleton’s rule, *better a mischief than an inconvenience*, sounds oddly, but hath this very meaning, and is very good law; and the reason is, there can be no law but contingent mischiefs to particulars may, and do often happen; but the consideration of them doth not disable a law that hath a general view: and who ever argues against a law, from a supposition of such mischiefs possible, argues against all law, and for anarchy and confusion. And the law hath another rule, which respects the same case; which is, *de minimis non curat lex*: and no contingent mischiefs, to particular persons, are regarded against the general convenience of a law, especially when government, common peace, and protection depends upon it.’

‘ These maxims of law, say these *non-resisters*, are sufficient to answer all the popular reasonings of men of former and latter times, built upon the possibility of particular mischiefs. But they say farther, all reasoning is out of doors where there is positive law. Themselves will not deny the statute of treasons to be law, and in full force. And then there is a new foot, upon which the case stands; so that if there were ever any former maxims, modifications, practices, or settlements of power contrary to that, call them covenants, contracts, fundamental principles, or whatever you please, they all sink into and are drowned in that, as latter laws (inconsistent) always repeal former. And it is well it is so; for there are evidences in history that, before the

‘ making

' making of that law, which the lawyers say is
 ' but declaratory of what the law was in truth
 ' before, there were great stretches ; and even
 ' *læsa majestas* was construed treason : but they
 ' make farther use of this statute, which was a
 ' vast ease and safety to the people, by some far-
 ' ther reflections afterwards. In the mean time,
 ' they say their adversaries may not fairly alledge
 ' for answer, that it is not ingenuous to refer to
 ' actual process, or course of law, and the conse-
 ' quences of that, because all governments will
 ' take care of themselves, and that the laws shall
 ' be declared entirely on their side ; as if this in-
 ' sisting on positive law, were a subterfuge, rather
 ' than an argument. But those gentlemen do not
 ' allow such answer to be just, or any colour ; for
 ' will not all irregular persons, as well as traitors,
 ' viz. felons, and wrong-doers, if they may come
 ' off so, or if they are too strong for the judge,
 ' answer the same thing ? Why the one more than
 ' the other ? To object power against the force of
 ' positive law, is ridiculous ; for, without a title
 ' to absolute power, there can be no law at all.
 ' For temper therefore in *England*, it is provided
 ' by law, that there be proper judges, competent
 ' to decide all questions of right and wrong, whe-
 ' ther it concerns powers or interests, and such
 ' as are put under all obligations of duty and oaths
 ' to do right according to law. But yet, say
 ' these *non-resisters*, to enforce their reasoning, and
 ' bring it to the height of demonstration on their
 ' side, they will suspend the judges immediate
 ' authority, though that be decisive, and state the
 ' case upon universal principles, and reasons at
 ' large ; and then

' They take notice of some terms commonly
 ' used in this dispute ; and first, that *non-resistance*
 ' and

‘ and *passive-obedience* are synonymous, and mean
 ‘ one and the same thing, that is a negation of
 ‘ all active force, whatever the consequence is.
 ‘ Obedience, in common acceptation of the word,
 ‘ sounds *active*, and therefore doth not well bear
 ‘ such an adjective as *passive*; *non-resistance* is pro-
 ‘ perly *passive*: but common use hath confounded
 ‘ the language, and divers words or phrases brought
 ‘ to signify one and the same thing; which is only
 ‘ a chusing to suffer, rather than obey unlawful
 ‘ commands. And it is very injurious to infer
 ‘ from such a behaviour, that any power or pre-
 ‘ rogative, more than is lawful, is thereby recog-
 ‘ nised; but it is one way, and an effectual one,
 ‘ of flying in the face, as they say, of an exorbi-
 ‘ tant power, and a flat contradiction to it. Thence
 ‘ it is inferred, that, in all civil concerns, the law
 ‘ is the rule of obedience, whether *active* or (as it
 ‘ is termed) *passive*; only the former belongs to
 ‘ *lawful*, and the latter to *unlawful* commands.
 ‘ And there can be no better means of asserting
 ‘ the rights of the people by law, than the disown-
 ‘ ing unlawful commands by patient suffering. For
 ‘ which reason the *passive-obedience men* are the
 ‘ most express defenders of the laws against un-
 ‘ bounded prerogative; as was demonstrated by
 ‘ the heroic carriage, towards the government, of
 ‘ some of the enthronised Clergy (*others* as they
 ‘ were) in a former reign.

‘ Then they observe, that instead of the old
 ‘ way of expression, the laws of this kingdom, or
 ‘ nation, his Majesty’s laws, the laws of the land,
 ‘ or the common law, some affect to use the word
 ‘ *constitution*; which in itself is no ill word, and
 ‘ means no other than as before. But it is com-
 ‘ monly brought forward with a republican face,
 ‘ as if it meant somewhat excluding, or opposite

• to

' to the monarchy, and carried an insinuation as of
 ' a co-ordination, or co-ercion of the monarchy:
 ' which latter term, *viz.* the monarchy of *Eng-*
 ' *land*, as of old, so still, implies the *whole law*;
 ' as the crown, in all the authentic books, is main-
 ' tained to be *fons justitiæ*: and it is no where to
 ' be found, that the crown was one thing, and the
 ' constitution another; but the true constitution of
 ' *England*, is the monarchy as established by law.
 ' And so acts of parliament always refer (and an-
 ' ciently more express than now) to the grant and
 ' ordination of the crown, with the usual additi-
 ' ons respecting the two houses. It is dangerous
 ' to vary the language of the law; because those
 ' who do not well distinguish, are carried into
 ' mistaken notions of the publick thereby:

' Then they say, as to precedents, that they are
 ' not to be received as a rule of legal authority,
 ' but when done in quiet and regular times, approv-
 ' ed and allowed by a constant usage in succeeding
 ' times: for escapes are no precedents. There
 ' have been some of this sort, as the late *Par-*
 ' *ricide* of King CHARLES I. by *Cromwell*,
 ' who (to go no higher) died in his bed. Which
 ' action, since the *happy* RESTORATION, hath
 ' not been allowed a warrantable precedent; but
 ' yet wicked men, if permitted to have power,
 ' would alledge and use it as such. Undue prece-
 ' dents are very dangerous to liberty; for there
 ' are more and stronger instances of exorbitant
 ' prerogatives, than of republican encroachments;
 ' and the argument is as good for the one as the
 ' other. Therefore actions, out of Course, irre-
 ' gular, and *time-serving*, should not be received,
 ' as precedents decisive, in justification of powers.
 ' These prejudices removed, they state the case of
 ' obedience upon the true frame and oeconomy of

C

' right

‘ right in the world, and particularly upon the general or common law of *England*.

‘ They seem not to dispute, as some self-contradictors have done, but take for granted that, in all governments that ever were or can be, the *supreme power*, wherever it is lodged, is and must be uncontrollable and irresistible: That being a truth included in the notion of authority or power, so as, the one granted, the other follows; as two and two are equal with four, because in the idea they are one and the same. Government resistable is no government; and those, who say the contrary, are to be talked with no more than scepticks in philosophy, who pretend to doubt every thing, even of their own essence, which that very doubting demonstrates. So they take it as determined, *viz.* that, in any settled state, the *supreme power*, whether it resides in one, a few, or many, may not be lawfully resisted, in any case whatsoever, by any coercive force.

‘ In the next place, they say that, in *England*, the supreme authority is by law lodged in the crown, together with the two houses of parliament, when duly assembled. It is not at all material whether, or how it might have been otherwise placed; though it is naturally impossible that, in *England*, it can reside in all the people (as hath been vainly pretended to by some *democratic* cities of old) the people of *England* being separated too far asunder, ever to be immediately joined in one action. It is enough here that, by indubitable law and right, the crown, with the states of parliament, are to all intents the supreme authority, being what is termed the *Legislative Power*, which no subject ought to gainsay or resist. This they think will

‘ be

' be granted ; for who ever pretended to gainsay
 ' or resist an act of parliament, although, by na-
 ' tural possibility, it may be as iniquitable as any
 ' action of a single person can be? My lord *Cook*
 ' will have it, that acts of parliament, against
 ' common justice, are void ; as if one were passed
 ' for erecting a judicature to determine *parte inau-*
 ' *dita alterâ* [without bearing both sides.] But this
 ' must be understood in conscience and natural
 ' reason only, and not by the sentence of courts
 ' of law ; else, the acts to vest and devest private
 ' estates, and attainders of absentees, and diverse
 ' others would run a shrewd risque in *Westminster-*
 ' *Hall*.

' It falls out in the actual administration of go-
 ' vernment, that by reason the persons, invested with
 ' power, cannot act all things directly, the busi-
 ' ness is distributed in diverse manners, according
 ' to the policy of several states, to answer the ends
 ' of government : as for the making, judging and
 ' executing laws for punishing, defending, com-
 ' pelling, resisting, and the like. And these sub-
 ' divided offices, or branches of power, may be
 ' committed to single persons or junctos, as laws
 ' have provided ; and then all those persons or
 ' authorities become parts of the supreme power in
 ' their respective provinces. And (without re-
 ' gard to wrong or right) as the whole supreme
 ' power is, so are they, in their proper jurisdic-
 ' tions, irresistible by law upon any pretence what-
 ' soever ; not allowing any man even liberty of
 ' self-preservation. For who ever thought it law-
 ' ful for one accused, or condemned capitally,
 ' knowing himself to be innocent, and grossly abu-
 ' sed in the judgment, to kill the judge or jury,
 ' or hang up the hangman, to save his own neck ?
 ' A man kills the bailiff that attacks him with

‘ force to take him ; it is an offence capital, and
 ‘ he cannot plead *se defendendo* ; and the law re-
 ‘ quires no proof of malice. These considerations
 ‘ reflect violently upwards, upon the supreme
 ‘ power it self ; for if the derivatives in their
 ‘ offices may not be resisted on any pretence,
 ‘ how comes the principal, or supreme in the exe-
 ‘ cution of the whole power, to be resistable by
 ‘ force ?

‘ But say these gentlemen farther, that, in *Eng-*
 ‘ *land* (whatever may be elsewhere) the grand
 ‘ distinction of the supreme power is into the le-
 ‘ gislative and the executive ; which latter com-
 ‘ priseth all actual coercion and force entirely in
 ‘ itself. As to the former, as the law now stands
 ‘ (for the opinions and modes of speaking, which
 ‘ took place in ancient times, are dropt) it is most
 ‘ certain that, in real effect, the two houses of
 ‘ parliament have a co-authority with the crown,
 ‘ in making laws ; or it may be more agreeable,
 ‘ in other words, to say a negative voice upon all
 ‘ legislative acts ; or a little more, that is, a sort
 ‘ of rogation, or power to move for, and give a
 ‘ spring to, new laws, by petition, or otherwise,
 ‘ as the practice is. So as, in the main, no new
 ‘ law, of any sort, can be made or discharged for
 ‘ taxing, or otherwise, without the formal and ac-
 ‘ tual concurrence of both houses of parliament ;
 ‘ and either dissenting, or non-consenting, no new
 ‘ law is or can be made. And this union of pow-
 ‘ ers, in the making of laws, is that which, in
 ‘ *England*, is properly the supreme power abso-
 ‘ lutely and to all intents. The next thing is to
 ‘ consider how it is distributed, that is, between
 ‘ the crown and the two houses ; for there is no
 ‘ power or authority which is not derived from,
 ‘ or under, them or one of them.

‘ And

‘ And first say they, it is not found that the
 ‘ two houses, beyond this concurrent power in
 ‘ legislature, claim any proper agency in the go-
 ‘ vernment whatsoever. As for judicature in the
 ‘ lords house, it depends on the executive power
 ‘ of the crown, as other courts of justice do. Even
 ‘ private persons have often the like propriety in
 ‘ jurisdiction ; and it is the King’s justice, though
 ‘ administred by the lords : for the writs of error,
 ‘ that are the foundation of the legal jurisdiction,
 ‘ are returnable, *coram rege in parlamento*. And,
 ‘ as to them and the commons, the office of coun-
 ‘ selling, petitioning, representing, &c. in virtue
 ‘ of the very words, excludes acting : and it is
 ‘ what every private person may, and often hath
 ‘ a right to do. But the houses, either severally
 ‘ or jointly, have this capacity in the highest de-
 ‘ gree, being the greatest council and most uni-
 ‘ versal representative that can be called or assem-
 ‘ bled, legally in *England*. But yet, saving the
 ‘ share in the legislative and judicature, no act of
 ‘ the houses, or of either of them, are coercive, or
 ‘ will impeach any man at common law for dis-
 ‘ obedience ; and as for matters of privilege,
 ‘ grown into course, the coercion is still (formally)
 ‘ granted by the crown, and an officer of the
 ‘ crown, the Serjeant of the Mace, assigned to
 ‘ execute the house’s orders in matters of privi-
 ‘ lege. Else, the Commons claim no judicature,
 ‘ nor so much as power to administer an oath ;
 ‘ and, in matters of accusation, are petitioners to
 ‘ inform, as the sense of the word *impetitia* is, not
 ‘ unlike a grand Inquest of the whole nation. All
 ‘ which matters are touched, lest any of these par-
 ‘ ticulars, omitted, might be mistaken for an au-
 ‘ thoritative share in the executive government of
 ‘ *England*.’

‘ Then

‘ Then farther, say they, it appears that all the
 ‘ supreme power of the government of *England*,
 ‘ saving only that which is lodged in the two houses
 ‘ of parliament, is to be found in the crown. The
 ‘ general inference from thence is gross and obvi-
 ‘ ous, but they pursue it by steps. They say
 ‘ there are two conditions of the *English* govern-
 ‘ ment, the one sitting, and the other in va-
 ‘ cancy of parliament. The sitting, as to time,
 ‘ place, and continuance (saving the effect of the
 ‘ *triennial act*) is known to be in the pure direc-
 ‘ tion of the crown ; yet, considering that, out
 ‘ of parliament, there may want means to petition
 ‘ or advise, *de arduis regni*, it is an act of con-
 ‘ scientious trust and justice in the crown to the
 ‘ people in general (the said law apart) to hold
 ‘ frequent parliaments, and much more so accord-
 ‘ ing to that law, which turns it to a specifick
 ‘ right, that the intent of it should be pursued.
 ‘ But, in all points whatsoever, saving what has
 ‘ been alledged, the government of *England*, in
 ‘ and out of parliament, is exactly the same ; and
 ‘ none can say that, sitting the parliament, the
 ‘ crown hath less power of government than in
 ‘ vacation, nor, in the latter, more than when
 ‘ sitting.’

‘ To obviate an objection, that, in vacancy of
 ‘ parliaments, there is no supreme power *in esse*,
 ‘ because no new laws can be made, without
 ‘ which capacity the supreme power is imperfect,
 ‘ and, in the fulness of that authority, ceaseth ;
 ‘ they say that a power of positive legislature is
 ‘ not incident to a supreme power, but it is often
 ‘ perfect without any legislative power at all. As
 ‘ in *Turkey*, according to the maxims of policy
 ‘ there, no power upon earth can alter their laws ;
 ‘ for they (the laws) result from the religion of the
 ‘ country ;

country ; as here no power can alter the doctrines of the Gospel. And, with them, the question is never what should be, but what is the law ; and yet there is a supreme power in the person of the Emperor, as must be confessed. And the strains and abuses of ministers there to serve the turns of power, and the pleasure of great men, against justice and their laws, is no answer to the constitution which, *in thesi*, is unalterable, and yet there is a supreme power. But to be more plain. If there were no laws at all in a country, but the will and pleasure of a potentate, or some juncto, were really and truly the law ; that binds every subject in conscience to obedience. Yet even that supreme power is subject to rules, or law ; for there is not, nor can there be, any power upon the face of the earth, above, or without law. For where none are declared, and there is no superior to exact accounts, yet the law of natural justice and equity prevail. And so a despotick ruler is tied up as much to the law, in duty and conscience, as any sub-governor is, who, by his commission, is restricted to rules. But this duty of all governments doth not impeach the notion of supreme, whether it be declared or rests in the mind by nature. Either is without coercion, and equally obligatory. If coercion be supposed, then the power that coerceth, takes the place of supreme : and it is a *Pelion* upon *Ossa* to set power over power ; for that which hath the coercion of others, must be incoercible itself. And that supposed, and no obligation, but conscience and duty in the supreme power, where is the difference, whether it be guided by positive and declared law, or by natural justice ? All that can be said, is that laws assist the weak capacities of
some

‘ some men in power, by telling them what ought,
 ‘ and what ought not, to be done, which their
 ‘ own natural skill might not perhaps have found
 ‘ out. Though I may say there is scarce a sincere
 ‘ person in the world, whom the *golden rule*, Do
 ‘ AS YOU WOULD BE DONE BY, will not direct :
 ‘ so it is corrupt will, and not want of understand-
 ‘ ing, that often misleads men ; and that takes
 ‘ place against positive law as well as against na-
 ‘ tural justice. So it returns every way upon
 ‘ the conscience of powers ; for if we admit a
 ‘ superior coercion, or in the commoner phrase,
 ‘ a liberty (with power) to resist, even that may be
 ‘ exercised with as bad a conscience as the other ;
 ‘ and then what is got by the bargain ?’

‘ But they say also, that it is a most pernicious
 ‘ error to discharge the supreme power of the ob-
 ‘ ligation to justice for conscience sake, as they
 ‘ do who say acts of the supreme power, or (in
 ‘ the forinsecal stile) legislative acts, or acts of
 ‘ parliament, are always just, and, though made
 ‘ in partial cases, are not injurious because abso-
 ‘ lute : for a legislative or supreme power, where-
 ‘ ever it resides, is as much bound to common
 ‘ justice and equity, in every publick act, as a
 ‘ private man is obliged to common trust and
 ‘ honesty. And he that says such powers do no
 ‘ injury, though their act is (as in possibility may
 ‘ be) most unjust and facinorous, because they
 ‘ cannot be contradicted, must, at the same time,
 ‘ allow that a private man, that breaks a secret
 ‘ trust, or kills his father, there being no evidence
 ‘ to check or convict him, is a very honest man,
 ‘ and hath done no wrong. Wherefore, if the
 ‘ consciences of men were not some security in the
 ‘ general, among promiscuous societies, and in
 ‘ the ordinary dealings of the world ; the cases of
 ‘ innocent

' innocent men, that are most apt to rely on it,
 ' were very hard. But I dare say that, however
 ' open differences make a noise, there is in the
 ' world, as bad as it is, more justice among men,
 ' upon account of the common obligation of
 ' equity and conscience, than from all the process
 ' of law and the coercion of the magistrate all the
 ' world over. And these men, who argue so strongly
 ' against all trust, especially that lodged in go-
 ' vernors, which is and will be a pure trust as
 ' long as the world stands, do but shew how little
 ' of that principle is to be found in themselves,
 ' which they think wholly wanting in others. It
 ' is most certain that *numbers of men*, whenever a
 ' publick trust is reposed in them, may (I wish
 ' I could not as truly say sometimes do) *break all*
 ' *the commandments of God*, as well of the First as
 ' Second Table, as any private persons they are
 ' chose to be a guard against. And to conclude,
 ' the having power is so far from an excuse for
 ' doing ill things, that it aggravates them; as
 ' when dogs, that are to keep, worry the sheep.
 ' A common thief has more to say for himself,
 ' than an oppressor or murderer, by power, who
 ' cannot be coerced. All these matters laid toge-
 ' ther, make it plain that, whether there be a
 ' legislative power *in Esse* or not, there is always
 ' a supreme power which commands all the forces
 ' of the state, and is by law, as well in the ab-
 ' sence as in the presence of the legislative, irre-
 ' sistible with force, and that will fall out to be
 ' the case of the crown of *England*.'

' They farther alledge, that the premisses will
 ' most clearly appear, if we consider that the le-
 ' gislature, whereof the two houses partake, is of
 ' such a nature that resistance, with force, doth not
 ' take place against it. For laws themselves are

D

' but

‘ but the voice or words of power, and have au-
 ‘ thority to create a duty, but no active force to
 ‘ compel obedience, or to which resistance can be
 ‘ applied; for who can offer to resist a mere sound?
 ‘ When the executive power comes forward with
 ‘ a strong hand, then there is somewhat to resist,
 ‘ but not else. Therefore resistance or obedience,
 ‘ active or passive, relate wholly to executive power,
 ‘ without which the legislative is enervous and in-
 ‘ effectual. Now all the rest of the supreme
 ‘ power of the government of *England* (except
 ‘ only legislature, or the *non-resistable* part, wherein
 ‘ only the two houses are sharers) being owned to
 ‘ reside in the crown, it follows that the same ne-
 ‘ cessity, as makes any power irresistible, makes
 ‘ the crown of *England* irresistible, with force,
 ‘ upon any pretence whatsoever; which conse-
 ‘ quence is so plain as need not be enforced by
 ‘ varying the expressions or repetitions. And
 ‘ then, upon the same account, it follows that, as
 ‘ concerning the *passive-obedience* and *non-resistance*
 ‘ of the subject, with active force (legislature al-
 ‘ ways excepted, as not concerned in the question)
 ‘ the monarchy of *England* is the supreme power,
 ‘ and ought not to be opposed with force against
 ‘ its force in any case, nor upon any pretence;
 ‘ such opposition being a crime the laws stile *treason*
 ‘ or *rebellion*, for which the same laws allow
 ‘ no manner of justification.’

‘ And these gentlemen pretend to answer those
 ‘ nice arguers for resistance, that perpetually harp
 ‘ upon the abuse of power and the sad effects of
 ‘ it, which they would prevent or cure by resis-
 ‘ tance. They say that the matter of right and
 ‘ wrong is indeed founded in nature, and, in that
 ‘ quality, a law itself, however regularly enacted,
 ‘ may be (as I hinted before) abominable and wicked:
 ‘ that

‘ that is, the very legislative power, were it (as
 ‘ it is not possible) the majority of the people,
 ‘ but, as ordinarily it is, in select hands, may ty-
 ‘ rannize, and offend against all the rules of na-
 ‘ tural justice, common sense and equity; for
 ‘ which that power is to answer, as having trans-
 ‘ gressed and broke their trust, but to GOD ONLY;
 ‘ else the correctors of them become at that instant
 ‘ the legislative power; and then we are where
 ‘ we were before. Now there falls out a distinc-
 ‘ tion here, which is between *misfortune* and *in-*
 ‘ *jury*. For if a subject is a sufferer under a general,
 ‘ however wicked, law, he is unfortunate, but
 ‘ not injured; because he can claim no more than
 ‘ the common benefit of the laws of his country.
 ‘ And having, in due form, stood the judgment
 ‘ of the law, he can ask no more; his appeal
 ‘ must be above; there is no power on earth to
 ‘ relieve him. This was the case of *Socrates*,
 ‘ and we have his example, as well as reasonings,
 ‘ in the report of his case, to confirm what is here
 ‘ maintained. In short, it is absolutely impossi-
 ‘ ble to order affairs so, but whoever hath power
 ‘ to do right, hath, of consequence, power to do
 ‘ wrong: and if resistance be introduced upon a
 ‘ supposal (which may be made no less arbitrarily
 ‘ and insincerely than any act of power can be,
 ‘ and commonly is so) of the undue and insincere
 ‘ use of regular powers, they declare plainly, that
 ‘ there can be no government nor distributive
 ‘ justice at all in the world.’

‘ And these gentlemen, to fulfil their argument,
 ‘ bring forward the Positive Law, or Statute (which
 ‘ was touched before, but it was not, as to one ar-
 ‘ ticle, specified) which is absolutely decisive of
 ‘ the question in the very terms: and now that
 ‘ comes forward, which is in the article in the

‘ Statute 25 Edw. III. that makes it *High Treason*
 ‘ to levy war. This is an expreffion fo general, as
 ‘ forbids refiftance upon any pretence; for the go-
 ‘ vernment is armed, and, if at all, muft be op-
 ‘ pofed by arms, that is, in array of war, or (as
 ‘ they fay) *more guerrino*. And that whatever
 ‘ the caufe is, not directed, perhaps, againft the
 ‘ King, but to pull down bad houfes, deftroy en-
 ‘ gine-looms, and the like popular and (as they
 ‘ think) meritorious purpofes, is folemnly adjudged
 ‘ to be treason, as levying war within this article.
 ‘ So, fay they, refiftance with force, which muft
 ‘ be by levying war, is prohibited on pain of
 ‘ death by a pofitive law; which puts the matter
 ‘ paff all argumentation.’

‘ The fame gentlemen defire to be underftood
 ‘ as to one objection, which is that this *paſſive obe-*
 ‘ *dience* or *non-refiftance* of theirs is a flavifh and
 ‘ degenerous principle. They answer NO: it is a
 ‘ principle of liberty and fecurity. For can any man
 ‘ be free, and fafe from the outrages of oppreffive
 ‘ potent neighbours, who doth not live under a
 ‘ power fufficient to keep the peace and protect
 ‘ him? The fovereign power is high and remote,
 ‘ and, commonly, the intereft of it is to be a
 ‘ friend to the *Community*. If the abufes, when
 ‘ any are, fall hard upon the Grandees that are
 ‘ near it, they are compensated in the ſhare that
 ‘ devolves among them; with which they would
 ‘ be more ready to opprefs their inferiors, if some-
 ‘ body were not above them to give protection
 ‘ and redrefs. And if the lufts and diforders,
 ‘ ſometimes incident to power, bring evil upon
 ‘ the people, it is ſcarce ever fo great, but, by
 ‘ the ordinary peace and protection the people en-
 ‘ joy, they are amply compensated. There is
 ‘ much more danger to a common man, of op-
 ‘ preffion

‘ preffion from bad neighbours, private enemies,
 ‘ and wrong doers, as also from the cabal at the
 ‘ next door, than from the potency of the govern-
 ‘ ment, though it should happen to be none of
 ‘ the best. And it is found that the worst govern-
 ‘ ments are those that have most heads and hands ;
 ‘ for the abuses of such are more diffused, and
 ‘ turn to a mere general oppression.’

‘ They observe that men argue much by
 ‘ way of interrogatory ; as for instance. Can it
 ‘ be imagined a nation ever submitted to be ty-
 ‘ rannised over by one Man ? Or is it fit that one
 ‘ man should have it in his power to make all the
 ‘ rest miserable ? However, in a just way of rea-
 ‘ soning, these questions are impertinent to the
 ‘ cause, yet they may be answered by other inter-
 ‘ rogatories. As, can it be believed, that a peo-
 ‘ ple ever were willing, or consented, that thieves,
 ‘ malefactors, and cheats, every where grassant,
 ‘ should have liberty to ravage and destroy at
 ‘ their pleasure ? And will not a people choose ra-
 ‘ ther to be subject to one man’s pleasure, upon a
 ‘ fair understanding, who is potent, and can pro-
 ‘ tect him, than be left at large to fight it out
 ‘ continually, in clans and combinations, to gain
 ‘ a little defence and safety ? They must answer,
 ‘ if any thing, right ; but then, say they, you
 ‘ may change, and have a better government.
 ‘ Change, ’tis true, but seldom comes a better.
 ‘ If they say it is better the government be weak
 ‘ and precarious, because, for fear of themselves,
 ‘ they will do no injury ; no, nor yet (for fear of
 ‘ themselves) hinder others from doing injury,
 ‘ which is worst of all ; and who lives that hath
 ‘ not had experience of this ? But not to spin finer,
 ‘ let it be only observed that the force of the ar-
 ‘ gument, of the resisters, lies in magnifying the
 ‘ evils

evils of ill government; and they will have
 those taken in utmost extremity, though but na-
 turally possible, and in no sort probable, if ever
 known to have happened in the world. But
 they say nothing of the evils that attend want of
 power in a government, which make a sharper
 catalogue by much than the other; and they are
 such as never fail to happen, and, which is
 worse, affect the whole people wherever they do
 happen; as all must know by experience, when
 the nerves of government have been relaxed.
 No political state is perfect, and the least evil
 is the best. Publick good, so much in these
 men's mouths, is a cloke which hypocrites always
 wear, and if you turn it up a little, the *nasty*
self-interest, injustice, and oppression will appear,
 that lies lurking under it. Those, who have been
 more than *once* burnt, which they say is the
 case of the *English* nation, will (it is to be hoped)
 watch well such fuel. The hardest case of the
 justest government is, that they are forced to de-
 ceive, to make people happy, that is to be
 quiet, or to take what is good for them. Give
 me the private man that honest dares be, and the
 government that justice dares do. Men that live
 in peace and safety, which are the ordinary fruits
 of government, are like men that live in health;
 then they are not contented, but long for pre-
 ferment, honour, luxury, and pleasure: but
 when they fall under diseases, and are in pain,
 then they would quit all for pure health and
 ease.

It is not alien to these speculations, to put in
 a word in behalf of the *English* monarchy and
 government, which hath many advantages to
 the people, but none more glorious than this;
That all acts of the crown, against law, are mere
nullities;

nullities ; and all that act under them are ob-
 noxious to the law, and so far from being pro-
 tected, that they may be questioned and punished
 by that very power, against whom its own com-
 mand is no defence or justification. And, for
 this cause, all authentick commands are put in
 writing, or sealed, or no person, served with
 such command, can be prosecuted for contempt
 in not obeying. For the party may know, by
 that, if it be a legal command, that requires
 active obedience, or not ; and by whose fault it
 is sent forth, whereby the proper officer may be
 brought to answer the delict. This constitution
 never was heard of in any state but the *English*,
 nor is it extant in force under any government
 upon earth : so little danger is there of excesses
 from the *English* monarchy. But if I were put
 by from this patriarchal privilege, and had a
 lot in times of disorder, and were put upon a
 choice of the two, I would certainly upon the
 competition, rather yield to one absolute poten-
 tate, *tale quale*, but having power sufficient to
 govern and protect, than to live in perpetual
 fear and proper guard against injury and oppres-
 sion from the most cruel of all sorts, that is,
 (not superiors so much as) equals, or rather infe-
 riors. It is an observation, which the general
 experience of ages may vouch, *viz.* That the
 calamities which have fallen upon the people of
England from the state of the government, have
 been incomparably more by reason of too little,
 than of too much, power exercised by the Kings ;
 and that by how much nearer the state hath
 warped towards what some call a Common-
 wealth, by so much hath tyranny got ground,
 and the true liberty of the people sunk down ;
 whereof great part never emerged to them, no

‘ not after the former government hath been happily restored.’

‘ But, to conclude with doing right to the cause, I must needs say, that it is not a just balance of interest that always regulates the good or evil consequences of power ; but the mere shew, name, opinion and prejudice, or rather humour of the people go a great way in it. For it may be observed, that it is not enough to do men good, but they must think and accept of it as such, and also trust their Government ; or else, whatever the truth is, they will not flourish in numbers and encrease of trade and wealth. Therefore it was a most wicked practice of the faction, to labour, as they did, to create misunderstandings and distrust in the people of their government ; which must needs tend to the destruction of their welfare and encrease. Now, to consider rightly the case, and make a judgment from the extremes, it is almost impossible prosperity, by encrease of people and wealth, should happen under the great *Asiatic* monarchies (although now, as the world transcends in wickedness, there can be no other than absolute government there) for the people cannot have reason to think themselves safe and secure in the advances they make, and, being careless of that, are ambitious of nothing but power to tyrannise over others, as they themselves are tyrannised over by their superiors ; they think of no prosperity but through oppression ; and so, by common consent, all are slaves. And this wolfish humour is such, that the government thinks their security lies in the destruction and depopulation of Provinces. And, to say truth, all defection of common honesty and truth, which should tie people reasonably together, not only tends to, but makes absolute government

vernment necessary. Hence, from the very name
 of monarchy, men derive a prejudice, as if no
 security for life or estate were had under it; where
 it may be made appear that, in monarchic coun-
 tries, which have laws of government, as well
 as of property, such as we call mixt, there is
 more real security than is to be found elsewhere,
 although there may be much more pretension to
 it. To instance in the pretended republics of
Venice and *Holland*; the former is a pestilent
 Aristocracy of the worst sort, that is of a multi-
 tude, under which the *Citta dinazza*, that is the
 community of the people, have no law or justice
 on their side, but as they gain the protection of
 one great man against another: and the other is
Holland, which hath no popular elections (essen-
 tial to a Republic) but Burgomasters fill vacan-
 cies by a majority of themselves; and so a facti-
 on is always prevalent, both in the towns, of
 which the combination consists, and in the Stadt-
 house, whereby the lands of the countries all
 about are made direct slavish, and sometimes
 taxed so as not to be worth owning; and all to
 save the citizens purses; and all preferments and
 succession run in a *match-making* channel and
family-relation; and yet the name of republicks
 holds these in credit, and the people are pleased,
 encrease and thrive. But whatever becomes of
 the humour and fancies of people, it is certain,
 for the utility of Government, when sedition is
 not permitted to grow too much upon it, that of
England is a NONPAREIL.

Our Author goes on, 'I hope (says he) this
 digression upon the subject of the *English* go-
 vernment, and the law of *non-resistance*, may
 be indulged, as well for the relation it hath to

* the temper of those times *, whereof the history
 is the subject of the present examination, as also
 by reason of the false colours the author † be-
 fore us has put upon it. He plainly accuseth
 the best men of the age of the worst of immo-
 ralities, and particularly of betraying the laws
 of their country to unbounded prerogative; and
 represents the doctrine, as well as law, of *non-*
resistance, like a dreg of traitorism and slavery;
 though [*like the Duchess of Marlborough*] he is
 not pleaded to account for the signification of the
 words he so much harps upon. Why could not
 he have honestly shewn what it was those worthy
 men, he is pleased to revile, meant by the terms
 in which they delivered their sense, and what
 that sense was? No, that had justified, or rather
 done honour to the Loyal Church-party, especially
 of the clergy; which was none of his business,
 but the contrary. His work was, as he brazenly
 expresseth it, to deliver them up to posterity in a
 dress as being illiterate, debauchees, false and de-
 testable traitors to their country, the laws, and
 religion of it. That is the mark he aims at, and
 levels his piece most artificially: first commends
 his partisans for all good qualities, then lets fly
 the contrary upon all the rest, by the description
 of *other* clergymen. To encounter this slander,
 as to principles, I thought it needful to state
 them with such allegations, as some of them in-
 sisted on; though I pretend not to have half drawn
 forth the subject; but the rest is to be found in
 their excellent books and sermons in print §.

* Reign of Charles II.

† Dr. *White Kennet* late Bishop of *Peterborough*.

§ As the harmony between *Law* and *Divinity*, and many
 others.

So

So far our *honourable* author, the great Mr. NORTH; who, in his EXAMER, from which we have taken the liberty to borrow this extract, has everlastingly obliged his country with the only authentick and well-vouched history of the reign of King CHARLES II. and who perhaps too was the person best qualified of any one in his time, to unravel that almost impenetrable mystery of iniquity, the *Hellish plotting* in that Reign. He was a careful, accurate and sagacious observer of men and things; saw with his own eyes, and heard with his own ears; examined, weighed, and compared; never satisfied till he had traced things to their first sources, and discovered the very first springs of action. To his own unwearied application, incomparable judgment and virgin integrity, (not to mention the advantages his rank, profession, and uncommon learning afforded him for this undertaking) must be added the great treasure of invaluable materials, he must necessarily be presumed to have acquired by means of the unreserved intimacy and entire confidence of his brother the great Lord-keeper NORTH, than whom no man, in the several high and eminent stations, he served the state, ever discharged his trust with more honour to himself, or to the more thorough contentment of his King and Country.

The above explanation of the *Gibberish* mentioned in her Grace's late ACCOUNT *, &c. which (as by her ridiculous *Cant Term*) one would imagine her totally ignorant of, we here earnestly recommend to her Grace's serious and attentive perusal: then let her Grace speak; and say, whether in her whole life (in the same number of

* P. 136.

pages, nay, or in ten times the number, HOLY SCRIPTURE excepted) she ever met with so much nobly and manly sense and true wisdom. We have here no idle precarious hypothesis, no fabulous *Utopia* systems, no wild-godse-chace after an imaginary state of nature, but the safe and well-grounded conclusions of experience and consummate knowledge in the NATURE, EXTENT, and LIMITS of our happy CONSTITUTION.

F I N I S.

The above explanation of the *Gibson* men-
tioned in her Grace's late account, &c. which
(as by her Grace's own words) one would ima-
gine her totally ignorant of, we here earnestly
recommend to her Grace's serious and attentive
perusal: that her Grace speak; and say, whe-
ther in her whole life (in the same number of

